Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism - PhilPapers

A coherent, unintimidating introduction to Western philosophy, written by a leading philosopher

Essays in Quasi-Realism by Simon Blackburn - …

Simon Blackburn is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge. Until recently he was Edna J. Koury Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina, and from 1969 to 1999 a Fellow and Tutor at Pembroke College, Oxford. His books include Spreading the Word (1984), Essays in Quasi-Realism (1993), The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (1994), Ruling Passions (1998), Truth (co-edited with Keith Simmons, 1999), and the best-selling Think (1999). He edited the journal Mind from 1984 to 1990.

So people cannot rely on their ordinary (moral) reactions to propositions couched in these terms to make allegedly theoretical, philosophical capital.

Essays in Quasi-Realism eBook: Simon Blackburn: …

As Dworkin presumably knows, I have approached this problem, as Gibbard and Hare have done, in ways that require quite delicate work in the philosophy of logic and language, including the work on interpreting subjunctive conditionals that he now appropriates.

Dworkin also echoes my doubts about the philosophical interest of property identity claims (see, e.g.

And that in turn may be, to echo Dworkin's words, part of what makes their incursions (there are honorable exceptions, of course) into philosophy so wearying, pointless and unprofitable, and the prominence they get such an indicator of the leaden spirits of our age.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is  by , Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI), Stanford University


Essays in Quasi-Realism: Simon Blackburn: …

After all Rorty is similarly, and above all, concerned to pull the rug from under discussions couched in terms of philosophically heavyweight or 'robust' notions of objectivity and truth, knowledge and fact.

Blackburn Simon, Essays in Quasi-Realism - PhilPapers

He asserts various moral claims, and he asserts the third-order view that there are no philosophical, second-order theories, about morality's aptitude for truth or objectivity.

Dymocks - Essays in Quasi-Realism by Blackburn Simon

One may wonder why, if fast track quasi-realism promises to succeed,the piecemeal approach of the slow track is alsonecessary—especially given that the latter is (it is agreed byall hands) the more intimidating project. Blackburn's answer is thatthe two approaches can play off each other in a mutually beneficialway. Results from the slow lane contribute to establishing theprincipal objective of the fast track: to earn the right to the use ofthe truth predicate in reference to moral sentences. “Fast-trackquasi-realism can benefit from the security provided byslow-track” (Blackburn 1993a: 197).

Essays in Quasi-Realism by Simon Blackburn | NOOK …

Because Blackburn is classified as all three—a moralnoncognitivist, a moral projectivist, and a moralquasi-realist—and because he has had such an influence on recentmetaethics, these terms have become somewhat confused in certainquarters. It is important to recognize the significant independence ofall of them. One can be a noncognitivist without being either aprojectivist or a quasi-realist; one can be a projectivist withoutbeing either a noncognitivist or a quasi-realist; and one can be aquasi-realist without being either a noncognitivist or aprojectivist. Only the last might legitimately raise an eyebrow, givenBlackburn's characterization of quasi-realism as “the enterpriseof explaining why our discourse has the shape it does … ifprojectivism is true” (1984: 180), which would appear to make ittrue by definition that all quasi-realists are projectivists. This maywell be so, but there are a couple of reasons for hesitating. First,Blackburn has a distinctive and somewhat idiosyncratic understandingof projectivism, so there are certain philosophical paradigmsof projectivism that his claim is not intended to cover (see Joyce2009b). Second, there would be nothing obviouslyobjectionable (perhaps not even anything that Blackburn would objectto) in broadening quasi-realism into the project of earning the rightto realist talk from any anti-realist starting point—inwhich case quasi-realism could be a program undertaken by, say, anerror theorist. Such a program would endeavor to explain why it mightremain acceptable for self-aware error theorists to retain theirrealist-seeming moral discourse. On this classificatory scheme, acertain kind of fictionalism counts as a form of quasi-realism. (Therehas been some debate over the converse: whether quasi-realism is aform of fictionalism. See Lewis 2005; Blackburn 2005; Jenkins2006.)

Read Essays in Quasi-Realism by Simon Blackburn with Rakuten Kobo

Typically philosophers thinking of themselves as realists will believe that they alone can give a proper or literal account of some of our attachments - to truth, to facts, to the independent world, to knowledge, and to certainty.