This essay outlines my arguments for restraint.
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Military Discipline and Respect for Authority Essay | Major …
A third kind of recognition self-respect involves the appreciation ofthe importance of being autonomously self-defining. One way aself-respecting individual does this is through having, and living inlight, of a normative self-conception, i.e., a conception of being andliving that she regards as worthy of her as the particular person sheis. Such a self-conception both gives expression to ideals andcommitments that shape the individual’s identity, and alsoorganizes desires, choices, pursuits, and projects in ways that givesubstance and worth to the self. Self-respecting people holdthemselves to personal expectations and standards the disappointmentof which they would regard as unworthy of them, shameful, evencontemptible (although they may not apply these standards to others)(Hill 1982). People who sell out, betray their own values, liveinauthentic lives, let themselves be defined by others, or arecomplacently self-accepting lack this kind of recognitionself-respect.
It also suggests that in a relationship of any kind, but especially an intimate or romantic relationship, it is important to discuss the definition of respect.
How Do We 'Respect' Authority We Disagree With? - …
The recognition/appraisal distinction has been quite influential andis widely regarded as the fundamental distinction. If it is, then itshould encompass the other distinctions (although some fine-tuningmight be necessary). And indeed, evaluative respect and perhapsreverentia for morally good persons are essentiallythe same as appraisal respect, while respekt, obstaclerespect, observantia, directive respect, institutionalrespect, and care respect can be analyzed as forms of recognitionrespect. Some philosophers, however, have found therecognition/appraisal distinction to be inadequate. Neitherreverentia for the moral law nor the felt experience ofreverential respect for the sublimity of persons as such (Buss 1999)are forms of appraisal respect, yet because recognition respect isanalyzed, first, as holding only in deliberative contexts, and second,as not essentially involving feeling, reverentia seems alsonot to be a form of recognition respect. Moreover, while valuing theobject is not part of Darwall's analysis of recognitionrespect—and it is not essential to some forms of recognitionrespect (e.g., directive respect) and is only indirectly involved inother forms (in obstacle respect, we don't value the obstacle but dovalue the goal it blocks us from reaching)—valuing is essentialto some forms of respect that are not appraisal respect. Inparticular, valuing persons intrinsically is widely regarded as theheart of the respect that all persons are thought to be owed simply aspersons. However, it is not sufficient simply to gloss recognitionrespect as recognizing the value of the object, for one can recognizethe value of something and yet not value it, as an insurance appraiserdoes, or take the value of something, say, a person's child, intoaccount in deliberating about how best to revenge oneself on thatperson. Respect for some categories of objects is not just a matter oftaking the object's value into consideration but of valuing theobject, and valuing it intrinsically. Analyzing appraisal respect asjust the positive assessment of someone's character traits as good issimilarly problematic, for one can evaluate something highly and yetnot value it. For example, one can appraise someone's moralperformance as stellar and hate or envy her for precisely thatreason. Respect in the appraisal sense is not just evaluating but alsovaluing the object positively. The recognition/appraisal distinctionthus seems to obscure another very important distinction between whatwe might call valuing respect and non-valuing respect. Appraisalrespect is a form of valuing respect, but recognition respect includesboth valuing and non-valuing forms. There are, of course, differentmodes of valuing, and at least three distinctions are relevant torespect: (a) between moral and non-moral valuing (or, valuing from amoral or a nonmoral point of view), (b) between comparative andnon-comparative valuing, and (c) between valuing intrinsically(valuing it in itself, apart from valuing anything else) and valuingextrinsically (for example, because of its relation to something elseof value) (Anderson 1993). A complete account of respect would need towork out a taxonomy that incorporates these valuing distinctions.
Autobiographical Essay] 568 words (1.6 pages) Strong Essays
In trying to clarify who or what we are obligated to respect, we arenaturally led to a question about the ground or basis of respect: Whatis it about persons that makes them matter morally and makes themworthy of respect? One common way of answer this question is to lookfor some morally significant natural quality that is common to allbeings that are noncontroversially owed respect (for example, allnormal adult humans). Candidate qualities include the ability to bemoved by considerations of moral obligation, the ability to valueappropriately, the ability to reason, and the ability to engage inreciprocal relationships. Some of these apply only to humans, othersto other beings as well. Even regarding humans, there is a question ofscope: Are all humans owed respect? If respect is somethingto which all human beings have an equal claim, then, it has beenargued, the ground quality has to be one that all humans possessequally or in virtue of which humans are naturally equal, or athreshold quality that all humans possess, with variations above thethreshold ignored. Some philosophers have argued that certaincapacities fit the bill; others argue that there is no qualitypossessed by all humans that could be a plausible ground for a moralobligation of equal respect. Some draw from this the conclusion thatrespect is owed not to all but only to some human beings; othersconclude that the obligation to respect all humans is groundless:rather than being grounded in some fact about humans, respect confersmoral standing on them. But the last view still leaves the questions:why should this standing be conferred on humans? And is it conferredon all humans? Yet another question of scope is: Must personsalways be respected? One view is that individuals forfeittheir claim to respect by, for example, committing heinous crimes ofdisrespect against other persons, such as murder in the course ofterrorism or genocide. Another view is that there are no circumstancesunder which it is morally justifiable to not respect a person, andthat even torturers and child-rapists, though they may deserve themost severe condemnation and punishment and may have forfeited theirrights to freedom and perhaps to life, still remain persons to whom wehave obligations of respect, since the grounds of respect areindependent of moral merit or demerit.